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KALEY V. UNITED STATES: THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE
CAUGHT IN THE WIDE NET OF
ASSET FORFEITURE
ADAM J. FINE
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Kaley v. United States is the type of case that can inspire intense
passions. It presents a deceptively simple question: Should the
government, on the basis of a grand jury’s finding of probable cause,
be permitted to restrict the defendant’s use of assets she has set aside
to retain counsel for her defense? Or, framed from the other side, is a
defendant who needs potentially forfeitable assets to retain counsel of
choice entitled, under the Due Process Clause, to a hearing at which
she can challenge the grand jury’s finding of probable cause? This
question pits two longstanding constitutional doctrines against one
another: the right to retain counsel of choice and the principle that a
grand jury indictment is immune to challenge.
The backstory of Kaley v. United States reads like something out of
a civil libertarian’s nightmare. A victimless crime, overzealous
prosecutors, vindictive use of asset forfeiture, and deprivation of the
right to counsel of choice all play starring roles. The full might of the
federal government is on display—proposing a showdown by accusing
defendants of a crime and then stripping them of the means to
employ their chosen advocate before the battle has even begun. The
2
old adage that “[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad law,” however,
counsels caution. As Justice Sotomayor noted, this case might be “one
3
in a million.” The hearing that seems appropriate and just in the
Kaleys’ circumstance might serve only to delay and distract in the vast
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law.
1. Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (U.S. argued Oct. 16, 2013).
2. Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No.
12-464).
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majority of cases without making any difference as to the restraints
ultimately placed on the defendant’s assets.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kerri Kaley received notice in early 2005 that she was the subject
4
of a grand jury investigation in the Southern District of Florida.
Kaley, a sales representative for prescription medical device (PMD)
distributor Ethicon Endo-Surgery (Ethicon), was accused of stealing
5
PMDs from hospitals and re-selling them on the black market. Kerri
and her husband Brian, who was also under investigation, maintained
that the PMDs they sold were old, unwanted models that hospitals
6
had voluntarily given to them. Kerri and Brian retained separate
7
counsel. To secure the funds to pay counsel through trial, the Kaleys
obtained a $500,000 home equity line of credit on their home, which
8
they used to purchase a certificate of deposit (CD).
In February 2007, the grand jury returned a seven-count
indictment, including one count of conspiracy to transport PMDs in
interstate commerce while knowing them to be stolen, five
substantive counts of transporting stolen property, and one count of
9
obstruction of justice. Under 21 U.S.C. § 853, the Government sought
criminal forfeiture of all assets deemed traceable to the substantive
10
offenses. Later, the Government obtained a superseding indictment
11
that added a money laundering count. Under the new indictment,
the Government sought criminal forfeiture of the Kaleys’ home on
12
the theory that it was “involved with” the money laundering offense.
The magistrate judge granted a protective order to restrict all the
13
assets subject to forfeiture, including the CD. The Kaleys requested a
“pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hearing” to challenge the
14
restrictions on their property. The magistrate judge denied this
15
request, finding that no hearing was necessary until trial. After the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

United States v. Kaley (Kaley I), 579 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Brief for Petitioner at 8–10, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-462).
Kaley I, 579 F.3d at 1249.
Id.
Id. at 1249–50.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1250–51.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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district judge affirmed that decision, the Kaleys lodged an
16
interlocutory appeal.
In the first of the Kaleys’ two appeals (Kaley I), a panel of the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for
a more searching analysis of the Kaleys’ request for an adversarial
17
hearing. The panel found that the district court had (1) failed to
properly assess the scope of the hearing and (2) had not fully
considered the prejudice the Kaleys might suffer as a result of the
18
asset restraint. On remand, the district court held a hearing at which
it allowed the Kaleys to contest the traceability of the assets in
question to the underlying crime, but did not permit them to
19
challenge the basis for the charges themselves. The Kaleys did not
20
attempt to challenge traceability. Instead, they maintained that while
the assets were traceable to the conduct alleged in the indictment, the
21
conduct itself was not unlawful. They argued that only a hearing in
which they could contest probable cause would satisfy the demands of
due process. After the district court refused to permit such a hearing,
22
the Kaleys lodged a second interlocutory appeal.
While the Kaleys’ case was up on appeal, the Government
proceeded with the trial of the Kaleys’ former co-defendant, Jennifer
23
Gruenstrass. Gruenstrass’s argument at trial was that hospitals had
24
voluntarily given unwanted, old-model PMDs to her and the Kaleys.
After the Government failed to produce any witnesses from the
hospitals or from Ethicon that would testify to being victims of theft,
25
the jury acquitted Gruenstrass of all charges.

16. Id. at 1251–52.
17. Id. at 1259–60.
18. Id. at 1257–58.
19. United States v. Kaley (Kaley II), 677 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18, 2013).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 18.
24. Id. at 18–20.
25. Id. at 21.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Right to Counsel of Choice
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution affords criminal
26
defendants the right to assistance of counsel. Long before the
Supreme Court decided that indigent defendants had a right to
27
government-appointed counsel, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a
defendant the right to secure counsel he could afford or who was
28
willing to represent her without being compensated. This right,
however, has always been qualified. Limitations include rules
governing admission to practice in the relevant court, conflicts of
29
interest, and the caseload of the desired attorney.
The right to counsel of choice is independent from the right to
30
effective assistance of counsel. The right to effective assistance of
counsel is part of the broader purpose of the Sixth Amendment to
31
ensure a fair trial. A violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel, then, is complete only if the violation resulted in a
32
substantively unfair trial. In contrast, a violation of the right to
counsel of choice is complete as soon as the defendant is erroneously
33
prevented from being represented by her chosen counsel. Because it
is the defendant’s choice that the right protects, the court’s opinion of
34
the relative effectiveness of counsel is irrelevant.

26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938).
28. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States (Caplin & Drysdale), 491 U.S. 617,
624–25 (1989); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say
that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice.”).
29. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 154 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A
defendant's right to have the assistance of counsel necessarily meant the right to have the
assistance of whatever counsel the defendant was able to secure. But from the beginning, the
right to counsel of choice has been circumscribed.”).
30. Id. at 146–48.
31. Id. at 147.
32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 148.
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B. Asset Forfeiture and the Right to Counsel of Choice
Here, the Government seeks criminal asset forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 853, which provides for forfeiture of property earned from,
35
used in, or related to criminal activities. The statute establishes the
“relation back” theory that property vests in the government as soon
36
as it is used in the commission of a crime. In order to preserve assets
for forfeiture, a court “may” issue a restraining order based on a
37
grand jury indictment. As a general matter, criminal asset forfeiture
has been held constitutional, even for assets needed to retain or repay
38
counsel. The remaining controversy surrounds whether due process
requires a hearing before the court continues to restrain assets the
39
defendant needs to retain counsel of choice.
1. The Grand Jury’s Role in Determining Probable Cause
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that a person
may be “held to answer” for a felony charge upon indictment by a
40
grand jury. The grand jury determines, based on evidence presented
by a prosecutor, whether there is probable cause to indict the
41
defendant. The defendant has no right to be assisted by counsel
42
before the grand jury. At the proceeding, the prosecutor may present
hearsay and other forms of evidence that would be inadmissible at
43
trial and the prosecutor has no duty to present exculpatory
44
evidence. A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Costello v.
45
United States indicates that courts should “abstain from reviewing
46
the evidentiary support for the grand jury’s judgment” and respect

35. 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West 2013).
36. Id. § 853(c).
37. Id. § 853(e)(1).
38. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624–25.
39. Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar.
18, 2013).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 (1958) (holding
that “infamous” crimes for purposes of the Sixth Amendment are those that carry a potential
penalty of incarceration for one year or more), overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
41. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
42. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
43. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1962) (“An indictment returned by a
legally constituted and unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of
the charge on the merits.”).
44. Williams, 504 U.S. at 55.
45. 350 U.S. 359 (1962).
46. Williams, 504 U.S. at 54.
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47

its important role as an independent body. Circuit courts disagree,
however, over whether this line of cases indicates that the grand jury’s
48
finding of probable cause is conclusive as to all pretrial matters.
2. Bail Hearings: Challenging the Grand Jury’s Probable Cause
Determination?
Bail hearings may constitute an exception to the general
proposition that judges do not reconsider probable cause after the
49
grand jury has issued an indictment. Before a judge may refuse to
release a defendant on bail due to concerns about the safety of the
community, the Bail Reform Act requires an adversarial hearing at
which the judge examines, among other things, the weight of the
50
51
evidence for the underlying indictment. In United States v. Salerno,
the Supreme Court determined that pretrial detention did not violate
due process because (1) Congress had a legitimate and compelling
52
regulatory purpose and (2) the Act offered defendants significant
53
procedural protections.
3. Modern Decisions on Asset Forfeiture and the Right to
Counsel
a. Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto III
On the same day in June 1989, the Supreme Court decided a pair
of cases addressing the interaction of criminal asset forfeiture and the
54
right to counsel of choice. Read together, the two cases, Caplin &
47. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
48. See Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting a circuit split as to
whether the grand jury indictment conclusively establishes probable cause for the purpose of
asset forfeiture when the right to counsel of choice is at stake), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580
(Mar. 18, 2013); United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[W]e do not read these cases as precluding a reconsideration of probable cause as to the
defendant's commission [of the crimes giving rise to forfeiture] in a pretrial hearing.”).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-de la Cruz, 431 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.P.R. 2006)
(“Even though a grand jury has found probable cause to believe [defendant is] guilty of a crime
of violence, the evidence currently before the Court does not support a finding that no condition
or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the
community.”).
50. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3141(g) (West 2013).
51. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
52. Id. at 747.
53. Id. at 750.
54. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto III),
491 U.S. 600 (1989). Monsanto III arrived at the Supreme Court after a panel decision
(Monsanto I) and an en banc decision (Monsanto II) at the Second Circuit. On remand from
the Supreme Court decision (Monsanto III), the Second Circuit decided Monsanto IV,
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56

Drysdale, Chartered v. United States and Monsanto III, hold that the
government may restrain funds subject to forfeiture before trial based
on a finding of probable cause, even if a defendant demonstrates that
the funds are needed to retain counsel of choice. Monsanto III,
however, explicitly leaves open whether due process requires the
57
court to hold a hearing before imposing pretrial asset restraint.
In Caplin & Drysdale the Court rejected a counsel-of-choice
58
based challenge to 21 U.S.C. § 853. Caplin & Drysdale involved a
defendant who had already pleaded guilty to drug importation
charges and sought to use funds to pay attorney’s fees he had
59
previously incurred. The Court held, “[a] defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person’s money for services
rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way that that
60
defendant will be able to retain the attorney of h[er] choice.” The
Court also noted that there was nothing unique about asset
61
forfeiture’s interference with the right to counsel. After all, the right
to practice one’s religion, to speak, or to travel may all be limited by a
62
defendant’s lack of financial resources.
Because Monsanto III involved the restriction of a defendant’s
assets before trial and before any plea had been entered, it presented
63
distinct issues. There, the Court read Caplin & Drysdale to indicate
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide no general bar against
seizing funds needed to retain counsel of choice based on a finding of
64
probable cause. The Court explicitly declined to decide an issue that
was already dividing the circuits: “whether the Due Process Clause
requires a hearing before a pretrial restraining order can be
65
imposed.”

discussed below.
55. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
56. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
57. Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 n.10.
58. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
59. Id. at 621; Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1190 (2d Cir. 1991).
60. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626.
61. Id. at 628.
62. Id.
63. Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 & n.10.
64. Id. at 614.
65. Id. at 615 n.10.
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b. Monsanto IV
On remand, the Second Circuit took up the question the Supreme
66
Court left open in Monsanto III. The Second Circuit split the central
question into two parts: (1) does the Due Process Clause require a
pretrial, post-restraint hearing? and (2) if so, what is the proper scope
67
of the hearing?
To answer these questions, the Second Circuit applied the
68
framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge. The Mathews test
invites courts to consider the interests on both sides of the suit in
determining what procedures due process requires when a party
69
stands to lose a property interest. The test accounts for the following
three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the government
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through
the current procedures and the likely value of additional procedural
safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the additional
70
burdens of the proposed procedure. After considering the Mathews
test, the Second Circuit held that the factors weighed decidedly in
favor of permitting a post-restraint hearing at which the defendant
could challenge the finding of probable cause for the underlying
71
indictment.
Today, a majority of circuits that have considered the matter have
agreed with the Second Circuit and permitted the type of hearing the
72
Kaleys seek. A minority holds that such a hearing must be limited to
traceability—whether the assets are traceable to the underlying crime
73
in the indictment—and may not address probable cause. After Kaley
II, the Eleventh Circuit is among the circuits that limit the pretrial

66. Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1188 (2d Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1203.
68. Id. at 1193; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
69. See Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1192–93 (applying the Matthews balancing test to assess
the private and governmental interests at stake when the government sought pretrial asset
restraint, which constituted a “deprivation of property subject to the constraints of due process”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note
6, at 34 (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court applied the Matthews test to a variety of
due process challenges to government procedures, including property rights cases).
70. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
71. Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1196.
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Kaley v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No.
12-464).
73. Id. The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C Circuits allow for an adversarial
hearing addressing both probable cause and traceability. The Tenth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits allow for a hearing limited to traceability. The Fifth, Third, and Eighth circuits have
not addressed the issue since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Monsanto III.
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74

hearing to traceability.

4. The Medina Test
If the Supreme Court declines to apply the Mathews test, it may
75
look to the test developed in Medina v. California. Medina involved
a due process challenge to a California state rule about the burden of
76
proof for demonstrating incompetency to stand trial. There, the
Court declined to use Mathews to assess a state rule of criminal
77
procedure. Instead, the Court, drawing upon Patterson v. New York,
held that a state rule of criminal procedure is prescribed by the Due
Process Clause only if it contravenes a principle of justice so deeply
78
rooted that it is viewed as fundamental. The Court reasoned that
explicit provisions of criminal procedure enumerated in the Bill of
Rights embody the Constitution’s careful balancing of liberty and
79
order. Judicial expansion of constitutional guarantees under the
“open ended rubric of the Due Process Clause” threatens to upset
80
that balance. Though the parties in this case dispute whether
81
federalism concerns were essential to the holding in Medina, no
Supreme Court case to date has applied the Medina test to federal
rules of criminal procedure.
IV. HOLDING
Having determined in Kaley I that due process demanded a
pretrial hearing, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Kaley II was
82
the scope of that hearing. The court held that the district court was
correct to limit the scope of the hearing to traceability and to prohibit
the Kaleys from challenging probable cause as to the underlying
83
crimes in the indictment.

74. Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18,
2013).
75. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
76. Id. at 439.
77. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
78. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443–46.
79. Id. at 443.
80. Id.
81. Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No.
12-462); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (No. 12-462).
82. Kaley II, 677 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (Mar. 18,
2013).
83. Id.
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The court found that 21 U.S.C. § 853 clearly states that, based on a
grand jury indictment, assets subject to forfeiture may be restrained
84
without further proceedings. As a result, the case presented the
constitutional question of whether due process itself requires a
85
hearing.
Due process, the court determined, requires a hearing on the
traceability of the assets to the alleged crime, but does not permit
86
defendants to challenge the grand jury’s finding of probable cause.
Relying heavily on Costello and its progeny, the court held that
allowing a hearing on the merits of the indictment would run counter
to the weight of precedent evincing a “powerful reluctance to allow
pretrial challenges to the evidentiary support for an indictment,”
87
while adding nothing to the ultimate guarantee of a fair trial.
Because the grand jury is an independent institution long seen as a
bulwark against oppressive or arbitrary prosecution, defendants have
88
no right to challenge the sufficiency of its probable cause findings.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the hearing proposed by the
Kaleys would amount to a type of mini-trial that would pose a direct
89
challenge to the grand jury. The district court, then, was correct to
prohibit the Kaleys from challenging the grand jury’s finding that they
90
had violated federal laws against theft and money laundering.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. The Kaleys’ Argument
The Kaleys’ central argument is that when property essential to
retain counsel of choice is at stake, the ex parte grand jury proceeding
does not satisfy the central tenet of due process: the opportunity to be
91
heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Instead,
due process requires a pretrial adversarial hearing at which the
92
defendant may challenge the grounds for asset restraint. The
Mathews test, which provides the proper framework for assessing the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326–28.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 30.
Id. at 32.
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demands of due process in this context, calls for an adversarial
93
hearing in the Kaleys’ case.
1. Mathews Test Analysis
a. The Kaleys’ Private Interests
The Kaleys argue that the private interest at stake—the ability to
94
use their property to retain counsel of choice—is significant. For the
right to counsel of choice to be of consequence, it must be exercised
95
during the relevant window of opportunity. Although delaying the
due process hearing until trial would only temporarily deprive the
Kaleys of their property, it would “completely eviscerate their right to
96
counsel of choice.”
The Kaleys argue that because they have a significant property
interest at stake, the Supreme Court should apply the Mathews test to
determine the procedures to which they are entitled under the Due
97
Process Clause. The Court, applying the Mathews test, has repeatedly
held that due process requires an adversarial hearing in civil
98
attachment and forfeiture cases. Unlike parties to civil suits, the
99
Kaleys stand to lose not only property but also liberty. Because, for
the Kaleys, “[t]he stakes could not be much higher,” they are entitled
100
to at least as much process as civil defendants in forfeiture cases.
b. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Further, the Kaleys argue that the risk of erroneous deprivation is
significant because the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in
101
the result of the proceeding. As the Court has noted, it makes sense
for the judiciary to provide closer scrutiny of government action when

93. Id. at 33.
94. Id. at 52–54.
95. Id. at 54.
96. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Kaley I, 579 F.3d 1246, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring)).
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id. at 54. The Kaleys’ brief discusses six civil attachment and forfeiture cases in detail:
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993); Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1 (1991); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 36–46.
99. Id. at 55.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 51–52.
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102

the government stands to profit from the result.
103
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (Good), the
Court cited a 1990 memorandum that the Attorney General
distributed to all United States Attorneys admonishing them to
significantly increase “the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the
104
Department of Justice’s annual budget target.” Since then, United
States Attorneys have dutifully heeded that admonition and asset
105
forfeiture funds have increased dramatically. The possibility that a
prosecutor’s judgment may be clouded by the prospect of institutional
106
gain necessitates proper procedural safeguards.
The Kaleys further argue that, although the grand jury serves a
constitutional role as a “shield against . . . unfounded charges,” it
should not be transformed into a sword to undercut the defendant’s
107
ability to fight those charges. Though formally independent, the
108
grand jury often functions as the “handmaiden of the prosecution.”
There, the accused has no right to testify and the prosecution has no
109
obligation to present exculpatory evidence. Such a proceeding does
not sufficiently mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation of property
110
needed to exercise the right to counsel of choice.
c. The Government’s Interest
The Kaleys argue that the Government’s interests are relatively
minor. Presently, the Government has no property interest in the
Kaleys’ CD or home; rather, it has an interest in the potential future
111
divestment of that property.

102. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 56; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991) (“[I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when
the State stands to benefit.”).
103. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 56 (citation omitted).
105. Id. (“In the 22 years from 1989 to 2010, an estimated $12.6 billion in assets was seized
by U.S. Attorneys in asset forfeiture cases.” (citing Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae
at 11 & nn.3–4, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-462))).
106. Id. See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980); United States v. Funds
Held ex rel. Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (observing the “potential for abuse” and
“corrupting incentives” of a system where the Department of Justice “conceives the jurisdiction
and ground for seizures, . . . executes them, [and] also absorbs their proceeds”).
107. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 56.
108. Id. at 58 (quoting Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury
Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (Winter 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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The Government’s interest in not revealing its case prior to trial
112
does not weigh heavily. Even prior to trial, the Government must
comply with significant disclosure requirements in discovery. This is
an interest, then, of limited duration—it amounts to a question of
when the Government will need to disclose its evidence or trial
113
strategy. In addition, prosecutors can always elect not to seek pre114
conviction asset restraint in any case where the burden is too great.
The due process inquiry embodied in the Mathews factors thus weighs
in favor of granting the Kaleys a pretrial hearing at which they may
115
challenge the underlying indictment.
B. The Government’s Argument
The Government’s primary argument is syllogistic: The grand
jury’s indictment is conclusive as to probable cause; probable cause is
sufficient to restrain assets, including assets needed to retain counsel
of choice; thus, the Kaleys are not entitled to additional, postindictment proceedings to challenge probable cause for restraining
116
their assets. The Government argues that, in analyzing this question,
the court should employ the Medina test, not the Mathews test.
Because “[t]he inviolability of the grand jury’s determination of
probable cause is itself a deeply rooted principle of American justice,”
117
the Kaleys claim fails the Medina test. In the alternative, the
Government argues that the Kaleys overestimate their own interest
while understating the Government’s, and that they would not be
entitled to any additional process even if the Court applied the
118
Mathews test.
1. The Grand Jury Indictment is Dispositive of Probable Cause
The Government argues that, under long-standing precedent, the
grand jury’s finding of probable cause is not subject to attack based
on evidentiary sufficiency, even with the added consideration of the
119
right to counsel of choice.
A grand jury indictment places
120
restrictions on a variety of liberty and property interests. An
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 61–62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 16–17.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 20; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 20.
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indicted defendant can be arrested, held pending trial, suspended
from her job, or deprived of the right to possess firearms—all without
121
any right to an adversarial hearing to contest probable cause. If a
grand jury indictment is sufficient to deprive a defendant of her
liberty pending trial, it must be sufficient to deprive her of her
122
property.
Holding a separate hearing to reassess probable cause after a
grand jury indictment could lead to anomalous and disruptive
123
consequences. A defendant could be told that, based on the grand
jury indictment, probable cause that she committed the crime in
question exists for the purpose of proceeding to trial, but that, based
on the judge’s independent finding, probable cause that she
committed the crime does not exist for the purpose of restraining her
124
assets. This “legal cognitive dissonance” would undermine the
public’s confidence in criminal proceedings, destabilize the role of the
grand jury, and “diminish the ‘high place [the grand jury has] held as
125
an instrument of justice.”
2. Even Under the Mathews Balancing Test, the Kaleys are Not
Entitled to Any Additional Process
a. The Kaleys Overstate the Interest in Retaining Counsel of
Choice
Asset forfeiture does not eviscerate the qualified right to counsel
126
of choice; it merely places a limited burden on it. The Court has
acknowledged that this right is circumscribed by a variety of factors,
127
including the ongoing legal duty to pay taxes. In this case, the Kaleys
funds are subject to asset forfeiture, which, like taxation, is a policy
128
that promotes general public interests. Asset forfeiture is not
designed to interfere with the defendant’s relationship with any
129
particular lawyer, though it may have that peripheral effect.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 33–34.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 34 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)).
126. Id. at 38 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1989)).
127. Id. at 39–40; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624–26, 631.
128. Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 39–40.
129. Id. at 40 (discussing Monsanto III, which held that “a pretrial restraining order” under
§ 853 “does not ‘arbitrarily’ interfere with a defendant's ‘fair opportunity’ to retain counsel”
(quoting Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989))).
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Restraining potentially forfeitable assets, then, is not the type of
arbitrary interference with the right to counsel of choice that the
130
Court has prohibited.
b. A Probable Cause Hearing Could Jeopardize Substantial
Government Interests
Further, the Government has substantial interests in preserving
potentially forfeitable assets for full recovery and in avoiding the
unnecessary risk to witnesses, time, and expense of a hearing that
would force the Government to prematurely reveal portions of its
131
case.
Criminal asset forfeiture serves three broad purposes: (1) ensuring
that “crime does not pay,” thereby deterring crime, punishing criminal
actors, and weakening the economic power of criminal organizations;
(2) returning money to victims and to communities; and (3) providing
132
financial support for law enforcement activities. These important
purposes give rise to “a strong governmental interest in obtaining full
133
recovery of all forfeitable assets.”
A pretrial evidentiary hearing would burden the Government
significantly by diverting scarce prosecutorial resources and by
134
forcing premature disclosure of its case and trial strategy. Beyond
putting the prosecution at a disadvantage, premature disclosure could
135
put witnesses at risk. These burdens could prompt the Government
to relinquish forfeiture claims even when its concerns have nothing to
136
do with the strength of the underlying case. Consequently, defense
counsel could invoke this procedure simply to gain a strategic
137
advantage.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 40–41 (arguing that “premature disclosure could . . . jeopardize the safety of
witnesses, including victims and cooperators[,]” particularly in cases involving drug trafficking,
terrorism, organized crime and political corruption where the risk of witness tampering is most
acute).
132. Id. at 41–42.
133. Id. at 41 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989)).
134. Id. at 43.
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id. at 46–47.
137. Id.
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c. The Additional Procedure Would Not Prevent Erroneous
Deprivations of Assets
The Kaleys’ interests might outweigh these burdens if there were
reason to believe that the proposed proceeding would prevent the
138
erroneous deprivations of assets. In over two decades since the
Second Circuit authorized these hearings, the Government is unaware
of a single case in which a district court has disagreed with a grand
139
jury determination of probable cause. Because probable cause
requires merely the “fair probability” that the defendant committed
the crime, this is unsurprising.
Given the limited utility of these types of proceedings and the
significant burdens that such proceedings impose on the prosecution,
the Government argues that the Mathews test tips in its favor.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court is faced with a vexing, if not uncommon,
dilemma in Kaley—the conflict of two longstanding principles of
constitutional law. Both the right to counsel of choice and the
sacrosanct nature of a grand jury indictment are fundamental to the
American criminal justice system. As a result, the Court is likely to
attempt to finesse the line by devising a solution that respects both
principles. The case will probably split the Court, though not along
traditional ideological lines.
A. Costello and the Inviolability of the Grand Jury
Drawing on a long line of precedent, the Justices will likely
emphasize that the grand jury is an important fixture of the American
criminal justice system whose findings are rarely, if ever, subject to
collateral attack. The primary divide among the Justices may be
between those who are willing to allow a limited parallel inquiry into
probable cause for the underlying charges and those who see such an
inquiry as an unnecessary and impermissible challenge to the
conclusive nature of the grand jury indictment. Even those Justices
that favor a post-restraint hearing will operate under the principle
that the grand jury’s finding of probable cause is typically beyond
reproach. No matter how much skepticism about grand juries

138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. at 49.
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140

pervades the modern academy, it is nearly unthinkable that the
Court would openly question a system that is enshrined in the Bill of
141
Rights. Even if the independence of the grand jury is a fiction, it is a
142
fiction the judiciary has been content to accept for centuries.
The Court will not permit a post-indictment hearing that would
involve direct inquiry into the grand jury proceeding itself. The
143
Costello line of cases clearly forecloses peering behind that curtain.
The Kaleys argue, however, for something different—an independent,
adversarial hearing during which a judge would consider whether
probable cause exists based on the evidence presented at that hearing
144
before that judge. Though other considerations might counsel
against such a hearing, Costello and its progeny are readily
145
distinguishable. Costello, United States v. Williams, and United States
146
v. Calandra all involved attempts by defendants to pull back the
curtain and directly challenge the validity of what transpired in the
147
grand jury itself. In addition, much of the logic underlying the
Costello line’s refusal to reassess matters considered by the grand jury
breaks down with the additional consideration of the right to counsel
of choice.
Because the deprivation of property needed to retain counsel of
choice can affect the outcome of trial, Kaley animates concerns that
were not present in Costello or its progeny. The Court in Williams
cited Blackstone for the proposition that the procedural protections
and rules of evidence deemed so fundamental at trial need not apply
before the grand jury because “the finding of an indictment is only in
the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried
148
and determined.” If the grand jury makes a mistake, the defendant

140. See generally Kuckes, supra note 108, at 2.
141. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (describing the grand jury as “a
constitutional fixture in its own right” (citation omitted)).
142. Id. (“[T]he whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of
the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government
and the people.”).
143. Id. at 49 (“Over the years, we have received many requests to exercise supervision
over the grand jury's evidence-taking process, but we have refused them all . . . .”).
144. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 12.
145. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
146. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
147. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (noting that the prosecutor is under no obligation to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (permitting presentation of
evidence to the grand jury that was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1962) (permitting presentation of hearsay to the grand jury).
148. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 300
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will have the opportunity to be vindicated at trial where all the
149
familiar protections apply. The purpose of trial is to get at the truth.
As long as the trial is fair, all’s well that ends well. This logic works
when the question is merely about the admission of hearsay or the
exclusion of exculpatory evidence before the grand jury. Whether the
grand jury bases its indictment on hearsay will not change the
outcome of the trial because hearsay evidence will not be admitted at
the trial itself. The logic breaks down, however, when the grand jury’s
finding of probable cause is used not only to compel the defendant to
stand trial, but also to restrict the defendant’s right to counsel of
choice. Interference with the right to counsel of choice can change the
dynamic and ultimate outcome of the trial. To use Blackstone’s terms,
the grand jury’s “inquiry and accusation” functions are being used to
prejudice the “determination” function of trial. In light of these
considerations, asset forfeiture requires additional procedural
safeguards.
B. To an Indicted Defendant, the Right to Counsel of Choice Is
Uniquely Important
For an indicted defendant, the right to counsel of choice could be
the right on which all others depend. Though impossible to quantify,
an experienced lawyer with time to devote to the case may have a
greater ability to mount a full and complete defense, giving the
defendant the greatest possible chance to avoid a complete loss of
liberty or, in capital cases, even life. And, regardless of merit or skill,
the Court has recognized the importance of a defendant’s qualified
right to choose her counsel.
Although other rights may be temporarily suspended pretrial, the
defendant’s right to counsel of choice is undermined if she cannot
exercise the right while it matters. The temporary deprivation of the
right to property will lead to an immediate deprivation of the right to
counsel of choice, potentially increasing the likelihood that the
defendant will suffer a permanent loss of liberty. This is simply not the
case with other rights to which the Government seeks to draw
150
analogies. A defendant whose assets are restrained may not
presently be able to, for example, make a pilgrimage she believes is
(1769)).
149. See id. (“It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but
to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”).
150. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 24.
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necessary to practice her religion. But this temporary deprivation will
not increase the probability she will be incarcerated, and thereby
permanently deprived of her liberty.
Even so, the Court in Caplin & Drysdale leaned heavily on the
151
logic that the right to counsel is just one right among many. In this
vein, Justice Scalia inquired of the Kaleys’ counsel how it could be
unconstitutional to restrain the defendant’s property pending trial
based on the grand jury indictment, when it is constitutional to
152
restrain her liberty and hold her pending trial on that basis.
However, Chief Justice Roberts observed: “It’s not that property is
more valuable than liberty . . . . It’s that the property can be used to
153
hire a lawyer who can keep h[er] out of jail.” Robert’s basic logic
should win out on this point. There may be no “hierarchy among[]
154
constitutional rights” in an abstract sense, but there is little question
that to a defendant awaiting trial, the right to counsel of choice is
155
paramount.
C. Will it Make Any Difference?
Five circuit courts currently permit hearings of the type for which
156
the Kaleys advocate, but it is unclear how this fact will weigh with
the Court. On the one hand, there is now empirical evidence that
judges rarely, if ever, release assets based on finding at an
independent hearing that there is no probable cause for the
157
underlying charges. On the other hand, five circuits have used this
procedure and federal prosecutions have continued, seemingly
158
unabated. Perhaps both sides have exaggerated the likely effect of
such a hearing.
Reports from the Second Circuit indicate that although judges are
unlikely to order the release of assets at a post-indictment hearing,
the looming possibility of a hearing strengthens a defendant’s position
in negotiations with the prosecution over the status of assets needed
to retain counsel of choice. Since Monsanto III, district-level judges in
the Second Circuit have presided over twenty-five hearings of the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 3–4.
Id. at 24–25.
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 24.
See supra note 73. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 8.
Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 15.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at 23.
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type the Kaleys seek. None of the hearings resulted in a district court
ruling that there was no probable cause for the indictment and that, as
a result, assets needed to retain counsel of choice should be
159
released.
Chief Justice Roberts, however, took issue with the Government’s
claim that these statistics indicated that the hearings made no
160
difference. It is likely, he reasoned, that the possibility of the hearing
discourages prosecutors from seeking forfeiture of assets that might
161
be subject to release at such a hearing. If probable cause is tenuous,
the prosecutors may determine that the hearing is not worth the
effort or risk. Likewise, counsel for the Kaleys pointed to an amicus
brief detailing how the Second Circuit rule had resulted in several
“courthouse steps” agreements between prosecutors and defense
162
counsel on the issue of restraining assets needed to retain counsel.
As the Court has observed in the context of plea-bargaining, most of
the work of modern federal criminal prosecution is done through
163
informal negotiations. That practical reality, however, in no way
indicates that the formalized procedural rules are insignificant. Parties
negotiate in the shadow of the law that they know will be invoked if
negotiations break down. The Court will likely recognize, then, that
statistics about the outcome of formalized proceedings tell only a
sliver of the full story in this context, particularly with so little data
available.
D. Asset Forfeiture and Healthy Judicial Skepticism of Government
Motives
One reason that Kaley has received a moderate amount of media
attention is that asset forfeiture has slowly crept into the public view
164
in recent years and become increasingly controversial. Most of the

159. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 36.
160. Id. at 16.
161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. at 16; Brief of New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 8–9, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12-464).
163. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“[P]lea bargaining . . . is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Robert Scott &
William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
164. See, e.g., MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL
ASSET FORFEITURE (Institute for Justice Report 2010), available at http://www.ij.org/policingfor-profit-the-abuse-of-civil-asset-forfeiture-4; Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER (Aug.
12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/08/12/130812fa_fact_stillman.
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attention has been on civil asset forfeiture, under which the
government may seize property in the absence of an indictment or
165
even an arrest. Many of the same concerns about due process that
animate concern about civil asset forfeiture—the presumption of
innocence, perverse incentives, and abuse of the criminal justice
system—also apply to freezing funds subject to criminal forfeiture
prior to conviction. In cases like this one, there is the added concern
that prosecutors may seek forfeiture to dismiss a particularly zealous
166
or effective defense attorney. In seeking the broadest possible scope
for forfeiture, the prosecutor has nothing to lose and everything to
167
gain.
In Good, the Court noted the potential perverse incentives
created by forfeiture, concluding that more searching judicial analysis
is appropriate when the government has a direct pecuniary interest in
168
the outcome of its law enforcement action. Justice Breyer seemed to
channel this skepticism about government motivations when he
pressed the Assistant Solicitor General about the percentage of
169
forfeiture funds actually allocated to victims of crime. While
insisting that paying restitution to victims is one of the government’s
central goals in seeking asset forfeiture, the Assistant Solicitor
General conceded that about five to ten percent of forfeiture funds
170
are likely allocated to this purpose.
The sympathetic facts of Kaley may also help to elicit this more
searching judicial analysis. After all, freezing assets may make sense in
the context of insider trading, racketeering, and organized crime. It
makes less sense for couples that sell—or allegedly steal—medical
devices.

165. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 164.
166. See Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 105, at 13–14; Kaley I, 579
F.3d 1246, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“A prosecutor has everything to gain
by restraining assets that ultimately may not be forfeited. By doing so, he can stack the deck in
the government's favor by crippling the defendant's ability to afford high-quality counsel.”).
167. Kaley I, 579 F.3d at 1266.
168. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1993).
169. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 42–43.
170. Id. at 43.
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E. Likely Disposition
It is likely that a narrowly divided court will hold that defendants
in the Kaleys’ position are entitled to a pretrial, post-restraint
adversarial hearing at which they may contest the issue of probable
cause for the underlying indictment.
A slight majority of the Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Breyer, will reason, in line with the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Monsanto IV, that such a hearing would satisfy the due process rights
of a defendant who needs restrained assets to retain counsel of choice.
Such a hearing would not conflict with Costello because it would not
require pulling back the curtain on grand jury proceedings. At such a
hearing, the government might choose to present different evidence
than it did at the grand jury proceeding, and the defense will be able
to present exculpatory evidence. The hearing, then, would take place
at a different time, with a different purpose, and with different
evidence presented. If the judge ultimately allows the release of funds,
she would do so on the grounds that the evidence presented at that
hearing did not establish probable cause sufficient to justify continued
asset restraint. There would be no inquiry into whether the grand jury,
in light of the evidence before the grand jury, properly found probable
cause. The grand jury’s indictment, then, would still be a perfectly
valid instrument for compelling the defendant to stand trial on the
charges alleged.
A second group, perhaps including Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
will likely dissent from the holding that due process requires a postrestraint, pretrial adversarial hearing under the circumstances. This
group could rely on the history of the grand jury’s role in American
criminal law and the Costello line of cases. They may argue that the
grand jury’s finding of probable cause has long been considered
sufficient to deprive the defendant of a variety of rights pending trial.
They also may warn that exposing the grand jury to criticism or
contradiction, even indirectly, is opening a proverbial can of worms.
Further, they may argue that denying defendants an opportunity to
challenge probable cause at a hearing does not violate due process by
171
drawing from the Court’s opinion in Medina. If the inviolability of
171. See id. at 9 (Scalia, J., seemingly channeling Medina in suggesting that “it’s hard to say
that [the ex-parte nature of the grand jury proceeding] violates . . . our concept of fundamental
fairness”). Because Medina is arguably limited to state criminal procedure cases in which
federalism concerns are implicated, this dissenting group may draw upon the language of
Medina, without holding that Medina controls.
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the grand jury’s determination of probable cause is itself deeply
rooted in American traditions and a sense of justice, there is no way
that denying a defendant the opportunity to challenge the grand
jury’s probable cause determination violates that sense of justice.
Finally, the dissenting Justices may emphasize the anomalies and
further due process challenges which a ruling for the Kaleys would
172
invite.
As an unlikely alternative, the Court could decide to overrule
Caplin & Drysdale entirely and hold that asset forfeiture simply
cannot constitutionally reach funds a defendant needs to retain
counsel of choice. Justice Scalia even offered some off-the-cuff praise
173
for this approach, given its simplicity and clarity. This approach
would have several advantages. First, it would be easy to administer.
Second, it would avoid entirely the morass of second-guessing the
grand jury. And third, it would provide the most vigorous protection
for the right to counsel of choice. With some of the blunt assets-areguilty-until-proven-innocent logic of Caplin & Drysdale eliminated,
more defendants could retain counsel with their own funds, easing
pressure on an overburdened public defender system. This approach,
however, would broadly contravene the intent of Congress in passing
21 U.S.C. § 853 and could inflate the right to counsel of choice beyond
its “qualified” status. Even libertarian organizations like the Cato
Institute and the Institute for Justice did not dare dream so big as to
174
argue for overruling Caplin & Drysdale in their briefs. Thus, this
approach is unlikely to garner a single vote.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will likely find a special carve-out of the
broader asset forfeiture regime in Kaley. Kaley’s most lasting impact,
however, may be in raising awareness about forfeiture policies that
will then prompt action in Congress. Congress is where clean,
equitable solutions could be crafted to allow defendants controlled

172. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 9 (Ginsburg, J. noting the anomaly of
allowing a judge to preside over a trial after he has determined that there is no probable cause
for the underlying charges); id. at 14 (Scalia, J. stating “the next case we have, if we agree with
you, will be somebody saying due process does not allow you to proceed with a trial when it has
been found by an impartial judge that there is no probable cause”).
173. Id. at 14.
174. See generally Brief of Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 105; Brief of the
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Kaley, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013) (No. 12462).
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access to personal funds needed to retain counsel. Congress has
previously acted to reform civil asset forfeiture, and could now act to
reform the intersection of forfeiture and the right to counsel of
choice.
Federal criminal defendants must confront the United States
175
government, the most powerful organization in history. In this battle
of Goliath v. David, is it too much to ask that David be allowed to
keep his own sling?

175. Ilya Shapiro et al., Legal Briefs: Kaley v. United States, CATO INST. (July 1, 2013),
http://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/kaley-v-united-states.

